Abstract. We consider n-person positional games with perfect information modeled by finite directed graphs that may have directed cycles, assuming that all infinite plays form a single outcome a ∞ , in addition to the standard outcomes a 1 , . . . , a m formed by the terminal positions. (For example, in case of Chess or Backgammon n = 2 and a ∞ is a draw.) These m + 1 outcomes are ranked arbitrarily by n players. We study existence of (subgame perfect) Nash equilibria and improvement cycles in pure positional strategies and provide a systematic case analysis in terms of the following conditions: (i) there are no directed cycles;
Extended abstract
In this article we study Nash-solvability (NS) and improvement acyclicity (AC) in pure positional strategies of n-person finite positional games with perfect information.
Such a game is modeled by a finite directed graph (digraph) G = (V, E) whose vertex-set V is partitioned into n + 2 subsets V = V 1 ∪ . . . ∪ V n ∪ V R ∪ V T , where V i are the positions of a player i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}, while V R and V T = {a 1 , . . . , a m } are the random and terminal positions. A game is called Chess-like if V R = ∅ and Backgammon-like in general.
Digraph G may have directed cycles (di-cycles), yet, we assume that all infinite plays form a single outcome a ∞ (or c), in addition to the terminal outcomes V T .
The standard Chess and Backgammon are two-person, n = 2, zero-sum games, in which a ∞ is defined as a draw. Yet, in a Chess-like game, n players I = {1, . . . , n} may rank m + 1 outcomes A = {a 1 , . . . , a m , a ∞ } arbitrarily. Furthermore, an arbitrary real-valued utility (called also payoff) function u : I × A → R is defined for a Backgammon-like game.
Remark 1 If n = 2 and m = 1 then the zero-sum Backgammon-like games turn into the so-called simple stochastic games, which were introduced in [12] .
All players are restricted to their pure positional strategies; see Section 2.8. We shall consider two concepts of solution: the classical Nash equilibrium and also a stronger one, the absence of the (best response) improvement cycles.
The concept of solvability is defined as the existence of a solution forany utility function u, from a given family. Respectively, we arrive to the notions of Nash-solvability (NS) and improvement acyclicity (AC). Both concepts will be considered in two cases: initialized (I), that is, with respect to a fixed initial position v 0 ∈ V \ V T and uniform (U), that is, for all possible initial positions simultaneously. In the literature, the latter case is frequently referred to as ergodic or subgame perfect.
Thus, we obtain four concepts: INS, UNS, IAC, UAC with the following implications:
Let us remark that UAC and IAC are special cases of the so-called restricted acyclicity, which was suggested for trees in [31] and then extended to arbitrary digraphs in [1] .
Our main results are given in the Table 1 ; they summarize criteria of solvability in terms of the following conditions: (i) there are no directed cycles;
(ii) there are no random positions; (iii) the "infinite outcome" a ∞ is ranked as the worst one by all n players; (iv) n = 2; (v) n = 2 and the payoff is zero-sum. Table 1 : Main diagram. Notation: NS = Nash-solvability, AC = Acyclicity; I = Initialized, given initial position, U = Uniform, any initial position.
First, UAC (together with the remaining three properties) hold for the acyclic digraphs. In this case, subgame perfect Nash equilibria exist (UNS) and all of them can be obtained by the standard backward induction [14, 29, 30] ; furthermore, UAC (and IAC) follow from Theorem 2 of [1] ; see also Section 4.
Then, IAC (and INS) hold for the two-person Chess-like games. In other words, (iv), even without (iii), implies IAC [1] and, in particular, INS [7] . However, these results do not extend neither the non-initialized nor Backgammon-like two-person (but non-zero-sum) games. More precisely, INS (and IAC) (respectively, UNS (and UAC)) may fail, even under assumption (iii), for the two-person initialized Backgammon-like (respectively, non-initialized Chess-like) games; see Section 3.
Remark 2 Interestingly, in Table 1 lines 1 and 2, as well as lines 3 and 4, are equal. Thus, it is not clear whether assumption (iii) ever matters. Surely, it helps a lot in proving Nash-solvability, since for all players cycling becomes a punishing strategy.
A more general type of payoffs is considered in [7] and it is shown that in this case assumption (iii) is essential; see Section 8.
The classical backward induction algorithm [29, 30, 14] for n-person Backgammon-like games on acyclic digraphs can be modified and applied to two-person zero-sum Chess-like games; in both cases UNS follows [2, 8] . Moreover, UAC holds too; see Sections 4 and 6.
In presence of random positions, IAC (and UAC) fail [12] , while UNS (and INS) still hold. The latter result is derived in [8] from the existence of uniformly optimal strategies for the classical two-person zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and limit mean payoff [16, 33] ; see Section 5.
Finally, the fundamental question "whether a game with a fixed initial position and without random moves is Nash-solvable?" (that is, INS for the Chess-like games) remains open. For the two-person case, n ≤ 2, the answer is positive [7, 1] . Yet, in general, there is no counterexample and no proof, even under assumption (iii). Although, in the latter case some partial results are known: (jj) INS also holds for the play-once games, in which each player is in control of at most one position, |V i | ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I [7] .
In [7] , INS was conjectured for the Chess-like games satisfying (iii). In fact, this conjecture was extended to a much larger class of games with additive costs; see [7] and Section 8 for the definitions and more details. It is shown in [7] that condition (iii) holds for these games whenever all local costs are not negative and that INS may fail otherwise; in other words, condition (iii) is essential for INS in the considered case unless the conjecture fails.
Introduction

Positional forms
Given a finite digraph G = (V, E) in which loops and multiple arcs are allowed; a vertex v ∈ V is a position and a directed edge (or arc) e = (v, v ) ∈ E is a move from v to v .
A position of out-degree 0 (in other words, with no moves) is called terminal. Let V T = {a 1 , . . . , a m } denote the set of all terminal positions.
Furthermore, let us introduce a set of n players I = {1, . . . , n} and a partition D : 
Plays, outcomes, preferences, and payoffs
Given an initialized game form (G, D, v 0 ), a play is defined as a directed path that begins in v 0 and either ends in a terminal position a ∈ V T or infinite.
In this article we assume that All Infinite Plays Form One Outcome a ∞ , in addition to the standard Terminal outcomes of V T . (In [8] , this condition was referred to as AIPFOOT.)
Remark 3
In contrast, in [18, 19, 20, 9] it was assumed that all di-cycles form pairwise distinct outcomes. A criterion of NS was obtained for the two-person bidirected case, that is, when n = 2 and e = (v, v ) is an arc if and only if e = (v , v) is.
A utility (or payoff ) function is a mapping u : I×A → R, whose value u(i, a) is interpreted as a profit of player i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n} in case of outcome a ∈ A = {a 1 , . . . , a m , a ∞ }. 
Figure 1: Non-initialized Chess-like and initialized Backgammon-like examples A payoff is called zero-sum if i∈I u(i, a) = 0 for every a ∈ A. Two-person zero-sum games will play an important role. For example, standard Chess and Backgammon are two-person zero-sum games in which every infinite play is a draw, u(1, a ∞ ) = u(2, a ∞ )) = 0.
Another important class of payoffs is defined by the condition u(i, a ∞ ) < u(i, a) for all i ∈ I and a ∈ V T ; in other words, the infinite outcome a ∞ is the worst one for all players. Motivations of this assumption are discussed in [7, 8] .
Quadruple (G, P, v 0 , u) and triplet (G, P, u) will be called a Backgammon-like (or Chesslike, in case V R = ∅) game, initialized and non-initialized, respectively.
For the Chess-like games only n pseudo-orders o = {o(u i ) | i ∈ I} over A matter rather than payoffs u(i, a) themselves. Moreover, in this case, ties can be excluded; in other words, we can assume that o(u i ) is a complete order over A, called the preference of the player i. The set of all preferences o = {o(u i ) | i ∈ I} is called a preference profile.
In contrast, for the Backgammon-like games payoffs u i = u(i, a) matter, since their probabilistic combinations are compared.
Strategies
Given a positional game form (G, D), a strategy x i of a player i ∈ I is defined as a mapping x i : V i → E i which assigns to each position v ∈ V i a move (v, v ) from this position.
Remark 4
In this article, we restrict ourselves, or, more precisely, the players, to their pure positional strategies. In other words, the move (v, v ) of a player i ∈ I in a position v ∈ V i is deterministic (not random) and it depends only on the position v itself (not on preceding positions or moves). Every considered strategy is assumed to be pure and also positional unless it is explicitly said otherwise. The latter happens only in Section 2.8, where we consider the strategies with memory and show that all non-positional ones can be excluded.
Let X i be the set of all strategies of a player i ∈ I and X = i∈I X i be the direct product of these sets. An element x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X is called a strategy profile or situation.
Normal forms
A positional game form G can be represented in normal (or strategic) form. We will consider four cases: G is Chess-or Backgammon-like, initialized or not.
Given a Chess-like initialized positional game form G = (G, D, v 0 ) and a strategy profile x ∈ X, a play p(x) is naturally and uniquely defined by the following rules: it begins in v 0 and in each position v ∈ V i proceeds with the arc (v, v ) according to the strategy x i . Obviously, p(x) either ends in a terminal position a ∈ V T , or p(x) is infinite.
In the latter case p(x) is a lasso, i.e., it consists of an initial part and a di-cycle repeated infinitely. This is because all players are restricted to their positional strategies.
Anyway, an outcome a = a(x) ∈ A = {a 1 , . . . , a m , c} is assigned to every strategy profile x ∈ X. Thus, a game form g v 0 : X → A is defined. It is called the normal form of G.
If game form
is not initialized then we repeat the above construction for every initial position v 0 ∈ V \ V T to obtain a play p = p(x, v 0 ), outcome a = a(x, v 0 ), and mapping g : X × (V \ V T ) → A which is the normal form of G in this case.
For the Chess-like game forms in Figure 1 their normal forms are in Figures 2 and 3 .
In a Backgammon-like non-initialized game form G = (G, D), each strategy profile x ∈ X uniquely defines a Markov chain on V . Given also an initial position v 0 ∈ V \ V T , this chain defines a unique limit probabilistic distribution q = q(x, v 0 ) on A = {a 1 , . . . , a m , a ∞ }, where q(a) = q(x, v 0 , a) is the probability to stop at a ∈ V T , while q(a ∞ ) = q(x, v 0 , a ∞ ) is the probability of an infinite play. Let Q denote the set of all probabilistic distributions over A. The obtained mappings g v 0 : X → Q and g : X × (V \ V T ) → Q are the normal game forms of the above Backgammon-like game forms, initialized and non-initialized, respectively.
Given also a payoff u : I × A → R, the normal form games for the above two cases are defined by the pairs (g v 0 , u) and (g, u), respectively.
These games can be also represented by real-valued mappings f v 0 : I × X → R and f : I×X×(V \V T ) → R. Indeed, let us fix i ∈ I, x ∈ X, and v 0 ∈ V \V T ; having a probabilistic In case of the Chess-like games, Markov chains and the corresponding limit probabilistic distributions q = q(x, v 0 ) ∈ Q over A are replaced by just plays and the corresponding outcomes a = a(x, v 0 ) ∈ A; respectively,
Nash equilibrium
The concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) is defined standardly for the normal form games.
First, let us consider the initialized case. Given
for each player i ∈ I and every strategy profile x that can differ from x only in the ith component. In other words, no player i ∈ I can profit by choosing a new strategy if all opponents keep their strategies unchanged.
In the non-initialized case, the same property must hold for every
for each i ∈ I, for every x defined as above, and for all v 0 ∈ V \ V T , too. a 2 a 2 a 4 a 4 a 2 a 2 a 2 a 2 a 6 a 6 a 6 a 6 a 2 a 2 a 2 a 2 a 2 a 2 a 4 a 4 a 4 a 4 a 6 a 6 a 4 a 4 a 4 a 4 a 4 a 4 a 6 a 6 a 6 a 6 a 6 a 6 
Remark 5
In the literature, this concept is also called "a subgame perfect NE". This name is justified when the digraph G = (V, E) is acyclic and each vertex v ∈ V can be reached from v 0 . Indeed, in this case (G, D, v, u) is a subgame of (G, D, v 0 , u). However, if G has a di-cycle then then any two its vertices v and v can be reached each from the other. Hence, (G, D, v , u) is a subgame of (G, D, v , u) and vice versa. Thus, the name a uniform (or ergodic) NE is more accurate.
Let us also notice that for a Chess-like game, the inequality
, which can be verified whenever a pseudo-order o i over A is known. It must be verified for all i ∈ I and for a given (respectively, for each) v 0 ∈ V \ T in the initialized (respectively, non-initialized) case.
On the UNS of Chess-like and INS of Backgammon-like games
From the above definitions, it follows immediately that UNS implies INS.
The non-initialized Chess-like game forms G 2 , G 3 , G 4 , G 6 given in Figure 1 are not UNS. The corresponding payoffs u 2 , u 3 , u 4 , u 6 will be constructed in Section 3. Moreover, u 3 and u 6 will satisfy condition (iii) of Abstract: a ∞ = c is the worst outcome for all players. In contrast, games (G 2 , u 2 ) and even (G 4 , u 4 ) have uniform NE whenever u 2 and u 4 satisfy (iii). For this reason, a larger example (G 6 , u 6 ) is needed to show that UNS may fail for two-person Chess-like games even under assumption (iii).
Let us also note that all obtained initialized game forms are INS for arbitrary initial positions. Moreover, it is an open problem, whether INS holds for all Chess-like games. This problem remains open even if (iii) holds. Yet, it is answered in the affirmative for the twoperson games, even without assumption (iii) [7, 1] . Thus, we can fill the first four positions of the INS-and UNS-columns of the Chess-like (left-hand) side of Table 1 .
Furthermore, the UNS of the Chess-like games can be reduced to the INS of some special Backgammon-like games as follows. Given a non-initialized Chess-like game G = (G, D, u), let us add to its graph G = (V, E) an initial position of chance v 0 and a move (v 0 , v) from v 0 to each position v ∈ V \ V T and define probabilities q(v, v ) so that v∈V \V T q(v, v ) = 1; furthermore, denote the obtained probabilistic distribution and the initialized Backgammonlike game by q(v 0 ) and G , respectively. By construction, games G and G have the same set X of the strategy profiles.
Part (i) is obvious; part (ii) will be proven in Section 7. The next corollary is immediate. This corollary allow us to fill the first four, negative, positions in the columns INS (and UNS) of the Backgammon (right-hand) side of Table 1 .
The fifth row of the Table shows that NS holds for the two-person zero-sum games. This will be derived from the classical Gillette [16] theorem; see [8, 23] , and also Section 6 below.
Finally, the sixth row shows that UNS holds for the acyclic digraphs. In this case all uniform NE can be obtained by backward induction; see [14, 29, 30] and Section 4 below.
Uniform and lazy best responses
Again, let us start with the initialized case. Given the normal form f v 0 : I × X → R of an initialized Backgammon-like game, a player i ∈ I, and a pair of strategy profiles x, x such that x may differ from x only in the ith component, we say that x improves x (for the player i) if f v 0 (i, x) < f v 0 (i, x ). Let us underline that the inequality is strict.
By this definition, situation x is a NE if and only if it can be improved for no i ∈ I.
Let us fix a player i ∈ I and a situation x = {x i , i ∈ I}. A strategy
for any x , where x * and x are both obtained from x by replacement of its ith component x i by x * i and x i , respectively. A BR x * i is not necessarily unique but the corresponding best achievable value f v 0 (i, x * ) is, of course, unique. Moreover, somewhat surprisingly, such best values can be achieved by a BR x * i simultaneously for all initial positions v 0 ∈ V \ V T .
Theorem 2 Let us fix a player i ∈ I and situation x ∈ X in the normal form f : I × X × (V \ V T ) → R of a non-initialized Backgammon-like game. Then there is a (pure positional) strategy x * i ∈ X i that is a BR of i in x for all initial positions v 0 ∈ V \ T simultaneously.
We will give a proof in Section 5, by viewing a Backgammon-like game as a stochastic game with perfect information with a (very special) limit mean payoff. Then, search for a BR in a given situation x ∈ X is reduced to a controlled Markov chain problem. It is well-known that in this case a uniformly optimal (pure) strategy exists and can be found by linear programming; see, for example, [4, 34] .
For the Chess-like games, Theorem 2 can be proven by the following, much simpler, arguments. Given a non-initialized Chess-like game G = (G, D, u), a player i ∈ I, and a strategy profile x ∈ X. First, in every position v ∈ V \ (V i ∪ V T ) let us fix a move (v, v ) in accordance with x and delete all other moves.
Then, let us order A according to the preference u i = u(i, * ). Let a 1 ∈ A be a best outcome. (Note that there might be several such outcomes and also that a 1 = c might hold.) Let V 1 be the set of positions from which player i can reach a 1 ; in particular, a 1 ∈ V 1 . Let us fix corresponding moves in V 1 ∩ V i . By definition, there are no moves to a 1 from V \ V 1 . Moreover, if a 1 = c then player i can reach no di-cycle beginning from V \ V 1 ; in particular, the induced digraph
contains no di-cycles. Then, let us consider an outcome a 2 that is the best for i in A, except maybe a 1 , and repeat the same arguments as above for G 1 and a 2 , etc. This procedure will result in a uniformly best response x * i of i in x. Indeed, obviously, the chosen moves of player i are optimal independently of v 0 .
Remark 6 Let us mention that a uniformly BR exists and it can be found by the same procedure when the di-cycles form not one but several distinct outcomes, like in [18, 19, 20, 9] . Let x * i be a BR of the player i in a situation x = (x 1 , . . . , x i , . . . , x n ). It may happen that x i and x * i recommend two distinct moves, v, v ) and (v, v ), in a position v ∈ V i , although the original strategy x i is already optimal with respect to v, that is, a(i, x, v) is the (unique) optimal outcome for the initial position v; in other words, the considered BR changes an optimal move in v, which is not necessary.
A BR is called lazy if this happens for no v ∈ V i . A similar definition was introduced in [1] for the initialized Chess-like games. In general, for the Backgammon-like games, a BR will be called lazy if the subset V i in which x i and x * i recommend the same move cannot be strictly increased.
Remark 7
In this paper, we will not discuss how to verify the above condition. Yet, we will need it only for the Backgammon-like games with acyclic digraph, in which case the problem becomes simple. It is also simple for the Chess-like game on arbitrary digraphs.
Best response and Nash equilibria in strategies with memory
In this paper, all players are restricted to their positional strategies. To justify this restriction, in this subsection we eliminate it and show that the result of the game will not change.
Let (G, D, v 0 ) be an initialized game form. A sequence of positions
Let us recall that strategy x i is positional if in each position v ∈ V i the chosen move depends only on v but not on preceding positions of the debut. Let X i and X i denote the sets of all positional and general strategies of a player i ∈ I; by definition, X i ⊆ X i . Furthermore, let X = i∈I X i and X = i∈I X i be the sets of general and positional strategy profiles; clearly, X ⊆ X . Now, we can strengthen Theorem 2 by simply noting that the positional strategy x * i which is a uniform BR of i in x ∈ X is a uniform BR of i in x ∈ X with respect to X as well. The proof remains exactly the same for both Chess-and Backgammon-like games.
The new version of Theorem 2 immediately implies that each (uniform) NE in positional strategies is a general (uniform) NE; in other words, if x * ∈ X is a (uniform) NE with respect to X then it is a (uniform) NE with respect to X , as well. The claim holds for both initialized and non-initialized cases and shows that non-positional strategies can be ignored.
Improvement cycles and acyclicity
Let f v 0 : I × X → R (respectively, f : I × X × (V \ V T ) → R) be the normal form of an initialized (respectively, non-initialized) Backgammon-like game. A sequence x 1 , . . . , x k ∈ X of strategy profiles is called a best response improvement cycle, or an im-cycle, for short, if x j+1 is a uniform lazy BR improvement of x j corresponding to the given initial position v 0 (respectively, to v 0 = v 0 (j) ∈ V ) by the player i = i(j) ∈ I, for j = 1, . . . , k. Standardly the indices are taken modulo k, that is, k + 1 = 1 is assumed.
Let us underline that in both, initialized and non-initialized, cases we restrict ourselves by the uniform and lazy BR improvements.
Remark 8 Kukushkin was the first who considered im-cycles in the initialized positional games [31] . He restricted himself to the trees and demonstrated that im-cycles may exist already in very simple two-person zero-sum games (with only four outcomes). To reduce the set of im-cycles he suggested the concept of the so-called restricted acyclicity, by which players are allowed to change their moves only in positions within the actual play. Making use of this restriction, he obtained several interesting criteria of restricted im-acyclicity for trees. In [1] , the concept and results were extended to arbitrary finite digraphs and IAC was proven for the two-person and acyclic cases; see the last two lines of Table 1 .
In this article, we restrict ourselves, and the players, to the uniform lazy best response improvements, in both non-initialized and initialized cases. The obtained IAC and UAC concepts look like a lucky alternative to Kukushkin's restricted acyclicity. In many cases, the latter is automatically implied by our "uniform and lazy BR" condition.
A game is called im-acyclic (AC) if it has no im-cycles. Thus, the concepts of IAC and UAC appear for the initialized and non-initialized games. Obviously, UAC implies IAC. Indeed, an initialized im-cycle is also a non-initialized one, but not vice versa. The inverse holds only if all k improvements correspond to one initial position v 0 , while in a non-initialized im-cycle they may correspond to different v 0 = v 0 (j) ∈ V ; see g 2 Figure 2 .
The implications (IAC ⇒ INS) and (UAC ⇒ UNS) also follow immediately from the above definitions.
Examples of im-cycles will be given in Section 3 for non-initialized Chess-like games; see Figure 1 . These examples allow us to fill with minuses the first four positions of the UACcolumn in the left-hand side of Table 1 . Furthermore, we refer to [1] to fill the IAC-column. Indeed, Theorems 2 and 3 of [1] imply that IAC holds for the acyclic and two-person cases; see also Section 4 and 6, respectively. Now let us consider the concepts of IAC and UAC for the Backgammon-like games, that is, the right-hand-side of Table 1 . UAC (and IAC) hold in case of the acyclic digraphs; see [1] and also Section 4. Yet, in presence of di-cycles, IAC (and UAC) fail in all five cases. For the first four, it follows from Theorem 1 and examples of Section 3, while for the two-person zero-sum games the corresponding example was constructed in 1993 by Anne Condon in [12] .
On Nash-solvability of bidirected cyclic two-person games
For completeness, let us mention one more result on Nash-solvability obtained in [9] .
Let payoff u : I × (C ∪ V T ) → R be an arbitrary function, where C = C(G) denotes the set of dicycles of G. In this model, every dicycle c ∈ C, as well as each terminal a ∈ V T , is a separate outcome, in contrast to the AIPFOOT case.
A digraph G is called bidirected if (v, v ) is its edge whenever (v , v) is. Necessary and sufficient conditions of Nash-solvability were announced in [18, 19, 20] for the bidirected bipartite cyclic two-person game forms. Recently, it was shown that the bipartiteness is in fact irrelevant. Necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash-solvability of bidirected cyclic two-person game forms were shown in [9] .
NE-free games with a unique di-cycle
Let us consider four non-initialized Chess-like game forms G 2 , G 3 , G 4 , G 6 given in Figure 1 . Each digraph G j = (V j , E j ) consists of a unique di-cycle C j of length j and a matching connecting each vertex v j k of C j to a terminal a j k , where k = 1, . . . , j and j = 2, 3, 4, 6. Graphs G 2 , G 4 and G 6 are bipartite; in other words, G 2 , G 4 and G 6 are two-person game forms in which two players move in turn; G 3 is a three-person game form; G 2 and G 3 are play-once, that is, each player controls a unique position. In each non-terminal position v j k there are only two moves; one of them immediately terminates in a j k , while the other proceeds along the di-cycle. Thus, in G 2 , G 3 , G 4 , G 6 each player has 2, 2, 4, 8 strategies, respectively. The corresponding normal non-initialized game forms g 2 , g 3 , g 4 , g 6 of size 2 × 2, 2 × 2 × 2, 4 × 4, and 8 × 8 are given in Figures 2 and 3 .
Let us start with g 2 and consider the preference profile o 1 : c > a 1 > a 2 , o 2 : a 1 > a 2 > c; in other words, player 1 likes and 2 dislikes c the most, while both prefer a 1 to a 2 . It is easily seen that all four situations of g 2 form an im-cycle; hence, none of them is a uniform NE.
However, INS holds for this example; in other words, if an initial position, v 1 or v 2 , is fixed then the obtained initialized game form has a NE for every payoff.
Both game forms, g 2 (v 1 ) and g 2 (v 2 ), are given in Figure 1 . It is easy to see that the considered im-cycle is broken in each. Thus, the obtained non-initialized Chess-like game is not UNS, although, it is INS for each initial position.
In positional form, this example appeared in [1] , Figure 10 ; see also Figure 1 of [8] .
In addition to the above counterclockwise im-cycle, the clockwise one is defined by the preference profile o 1 : a 2 > a 1 > c, o 2 : c > a 2 > a 1 . Obviously, there can be no more im-cycles in a 2 × 2 game form. In both cases, the preferences o 1 and o 2 are not opposite and outcome c is the best for one player and worst for the other.
Based on these simple observations, one could boldly conjecture that UNS holds for the two-person non-initialized Chess-like games whenever:
(A) they are zero-sum or (B) a di-cycle c is the worst outcome for both players. Conjecture (A) holds, indeed; moreover, not only for the Chess-like but even for the Backgammon-like games; see Section 6. However, (B), unfortunately, fails. Although, G 2 (and even G 4 ) are too small to provide a counterexample, yet, (G 6 , o) has no uniform NE whenever the preferences o = (o 1 , o 2 ) satisfy:
To verify this, let us consider the normal form g 2 in Figure 2 . By Theorem 2, we determine the best responses of player 2 for all strategies of player 1 and vice versa. It is easy to check that the obtained two sets of the best responses (white circles and black squares in Figure  2 ) are disjoint. Hence, there is no uniform NE. Furthermore, the obtained 16 best responses induce an im-cycle of length 10 and two im-paths of lengths 2 and 4 that end in this im-cycle.
Remark 9
Im-cycles exist already in g 4 ; one of them is shown in Figure 3 for the preferences
However, a uniform NE also exists in this case. Moreover, by a tedious case analysis, one can show that G 4 (and, of course, G 2 ) are UNS, unlike G 6 .
For n = 3 a simpler counterexample to (B) is known [7] . Let us consider the game defined by G 3 and the following preference profile o = (o 1 , o 2 , o 3 ):
In other words, for each player i ∈ I = {1, 2, 3} to terminate is an average outcome; it is better (worse) when the next (previous) player terminates; finally, if nobody does then the di-cycle c appears, which is the worst outcome for all. The considered game has an im-cycle of length 6, which is shown in Figure 2 . Indeed, let player 1 terminates at a 1 , while 2 and 3 proceed. The corresponding situation (a 1 , a 1 , a 1 ) can be improved by 2 to (a 1 , a 2 , a 1 ) , which in its turn can be improved by 1 to (a 2 , a 2 , a 2 ) . Let us repeat the same procedure two times more to obtain the im-cycle of length six shown in Figure 2 .
The remaining two situations, (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) and (c, c, c) appear when all three players terminate or proceed, respectively. They are not NE either. Moreover, each of them can be improved by every player. Thus, there is no uniform NE in the obtained game.
Finally, let us recall that, by Theorem 1, we can assign an initialized Backgammon-like not INS game to each non-initialized Chess-like not UNS game; see Figure 1 .
The Backgammon-like not INS game corresponding to the last example appeared in [7] .
Backward induction in case of acyclic digraphs
Let us show that UAC (together with the remaining three properties UNS, IAC, and INS) hold if digraph G has no di-cycles. The proof will be indirect. Let game G = (G, D, u) be a minimal counterexample, that is, G has an im-cycle Y ⊆ X, digraph G = (V, E) has no di-cycle, and there is no similar example G with a digraph G smaller than G. By minimality of G, for every move e = (v, v ) ∈ E of a player i (that is, v ∈ V i ) there are two strategy profiles x, x ∈ Y such that e is chosen by x i and not chosen by x i . Indeed, otherwise we can eliminate e from G (if e is not chosen by any strategy of Y ) or all other arcs from v (if e is chosen by all strategies of Y ), and Y remains an im-cycle in the reduced game G , as well.
By acyclicity of G, there is a position v ∈ V \ V T such that each move (v, v ) from it leads to a terminal position v ∈ V T . Let us choose such a position v, delete all arcs (v, v ) from G, and denote the obtained reduced graph by G and the corresponding game by G . By construction, v is a terminal position in G . Let us consider two cases:
Case 1: v ∈ V R is a position of chance. Then, for each player i ∈ I, let us define the terminal payoff u(i, v) as an average of u(i, v ) for all moves (v, v ) from v in G.
Case 2: v ∈ V i is a private position of a player i ∈ I. Then, u(i, v) will be defined as the maximum of u(i, v ) for all moves (v, v ) from v. Let such a maximum be realized in v 0 . Then u(i , v) = u(i , v 0 ) for all i ∈ I. Obviously, every strategy profile of an im-cycle will chose in v a move (v, v 0 ). Such a move may be not unique, yet, by the laziness condition, it will remain unchanged in the considered im-cycle.
In both cases, games G and G are obviously equivalent. In particular, the im-cycle in G remains an im-cycle in G , in contradiction with the minimality of G.
In fact, the above arguments result in a stronger and more constructive statement. Let us choose successively the pre-terminal positions v ∈ V \V T and make them terminal, as shown above. Furthermore, we will fix an optimal move, maximizing u(i, * ), whenever v ∈ V i is a private position. This recursive procedure is known as backward induction. It was suggested in the early fifties by Kuhn [29, 30] and Gale [14] . Clearly, in k = |V \ V T | steps it results in a strategy profile x * , which is called a backward induction (or sophisticated) equilibrium (BIE). It is also clear that a BIE is a uniform NE and vice versa.
Furthermore, a Chess-like game has a unique BIE whenever payoffs u(i, * ) have no ties. The above arguments also show that any sequence of lazy BR improvements (an im-path) cannot cycle; moreover, it terminates in a BIE whenever cannot be extended. In particular, UAC holds if G is an acyclic digraph.
Remark 10 It is a curious combinatorial problem to bound the length of a shortest (or longest) im-path from a situation x to a BIE x * . Yet, both problems hardly have a practical value, since it is much easier to obtain a BIE x * by backward induction (in exactly |V \ V T | steps) rather than by constructing an im-path from a situation x.
Remark 11 Let us note that the laziness assumption is essential. Indeed, otherwise, an im-cycle may appear, as the example in Figure 4 shows. In this example, payoffs have ties. However, even if the terminals make no ties, they still may appear in the backward induction procedure, in presence of random positions.
Finally, let us note that backward induction (and even INS) may fail in presence of a di-cycle; see examples of Section 3. However, a modified backward induction works for the two-person zero-sum Chess-like games; see Section 6.
Mean payoff n-person games
Let us recall the model of Section 2 and introduce the following modifications. Given a noninitialized game form (G, D) , where G = (V, E) is a digraph and D : V = V 1 ∪. . .∪V n ∪V R ∪V T is a partition of its positions, we will assume that there are no terminals, V T = ∅. Instead, we introduce a local reward function r : I × E → R, whose value r(i, e) is standardly interpreted as a profit obtained by the player i ∈ I whenever the play passes the arc e ∈ E.
A strategy profile x ∈ X uniquely defines a Markov chain on V . Whenever we fix also an initial position v 0 ∈ V , this chain defines a unique limit probabilistic distribution q = q(x, v 0 ) on V , that is, q(v) = q(x, v 0 , v) = lim t→∞ t(v)/t, where t(v) is the expected part of the total time t that the play spends in v. Respectively, for a move e = (v, v ) in a random position v ∈ V R , we obtain the limit probability q(e) = q(x, v 0 , e) = q(v)q(v, v ), where q(v, v ) is the probability of the considered move (v, v ) in v.
Then, the effective limit payoff (or in other words, the game in normal form) is defined as a real-valued function f :
The deterministic case, V R = ∅, is also of interest. In this case, given x ∈ X and v 0 ∈ V , we obtain a play p = p(x, v 0 ), which can be viewed as a deterministic Markov chain. Since all players are restricted to their positional strategies, p(x) is a lasso, which consists of an initial part and a di-cycle C = C(x, v 0 ) in G repeated infinitely. Then, q(e) = q(x, v 0 , e) = |C| for e ∈ C and q(e) = 0 for e ∈ C.
In the literature on mean payoff games usually the two-person zero-sum are considered, since not much is known in other cases. The most important statement is as follows.
Theorem 3 Two-person zero-sum mean payoff games are UNS; in other words, every such game has a saddle point (NE) in uniformly optimal strategies. This is just a reformulation of the fundamental result of [16, 33] . For the two-person zero-sum case, the above model (first introduced in [24] ) and the classical Gillette model [16] are equivalent [8, 6] .
However, IAC (and UAC) may fail for the two-person zero-sum mean payoff games even in absence of random positions. Let us consider the complete bipartite 2 by 2 digraph G on four vertices v 1 , v 3 ∈ V 1 and v 2 , v 4 ∈ V 2 ; see Figure 5 . Let the local rewards of player 1 be
2 )) = −1, while r(2, e) + r(1, e) ≡ 0 for all arcs e ∈ E, since the game is zero-sum.
The corresponding normal form is of size 4 × 4. It is not difficult to verify that the strategy profile x = (x 1 , x 2 ) defined by the strategies
} is a uniform saddle point, which results in the di-cycle (v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 ); see Figure 5 .
Yet, the following four strategy profiles define an im-cycle
Figure 5: Im-cycle in a mean-payoff game.
which is invariant with respect to all possible initial positions.
Remark 12
Moreover, it is not difficult to verify that the BR property holds but laziness condition fails for the above im-cycle.
It is an open general question whether BR lazy im-cycles exist for mean-payoff games.
If not then obviously every BR lazy im-path results in a saddle point.
It is also known that INS (and UNS) may fail for a two-person (but not zero-sum) mean payoff game, even in absence of random positions. In other words, the zero-sum assumption is essential in Theorem 3. The corresponding example was given in [21] ; see also [24, 8] .
Let G be the complete bipartite 3 by 3 digraph and the local rewards of players 1 and 2 on its 18 arcs be given by the following two 3 × 3 real matrices:
where r(i, (v, v )) = r(i, (v , v)) for each player i ∈ I = {1, 2} and every pair of oppositely directed arcs (v, v ), (v , v) , while ε is a small positive number, say, 0.1. Let us fix an arbitrary initial position, construct the corresponding normal form of size 3 3 × 3 3 = 27 × 27, and choose the BR of player 1 in every row and BR of player 2 in every column. It was shown in [21] that the obtained two sets of dicycles are disjoint. Hence, there is no NE. In [22] , it was shown that the above example is minimal, since INS holds for the games on 2 by k digraphs. Now let us demonstrate that the n-person Backgammon-like games form a very special subclass of the n-person mean payoff games [8] . The reduction is simple.
Let G = (G, D, u) be a non-initialized Backgammon-like n-person game. First, without any loss of generality, we can assume that u(i, a ∞ ) = 0 for all i ∈ I. Indeed, to enforce this condition it is sufficient to subtract u(i, a ∞ ) from the payoff u(i, * ) of each player i ∈ I. More precisely, given a payoff u : I × A → R let us define a payoff u : I × A → R by formula u (i, a) = u(i, a) − u(i, a ∞ ) for all i ∈ I, a ∈ V T , and denote the obtained game by G = (G, D, u ) .
Then, let us get rid of V T by adding a loop e v = (v, v) to every terminal position v ∈ V T . Furthermore, let us set the local reward r(i, e v ) = u (i, v) for each such loop and r(i, e) ≡ 0 for all other arcs e ∈ E and all players i ∈ I. Thus, we obtain a non-initialized mean payoff game G = G , D , r). The following statements are obvious:
• all three games G, G , and G are equivalent;
• game G is Chess-like iff G (and G ) are deterministic iff V R = ∅;
• all rewards r(i, e) are positive (non-negative) in G if and only if a ∞ is the worst (maybe, not strictly) outcome for all players i ∈ I of G;
• games G, G , and G are two-person and/or zero-sum simultaneously.
6 Two-person (zero-sum) games
Let us recall that UNS (and UAC) may fail for the two-person Chess-like games, even when c is the worst outcome for all players; see examples g 2 and g 6 of Section 3. Respectively, by Theorem 1, INS may fail for the corresponding Backgammon-like games. In contrast, IAC (and INS) hold for the Chess-like two-person games, not necessarily zero-sum. This follows from Theorem 2 of [1] ; for INS see also [7, 8] .
Remark 13
It it is a fundamental open problem whether INS still holds for the n-person Chess-like games; see Section 8. It is known that UNS may fail already when n = 3 and c is the worst outcome for all three players; see example g 3 of Section 3. For IAC, a similar example is known [1] only for n = 4, while for n = 3 the question remains open.
From now on, in this section, we assume that all considered game are two-person and zero-sum, without repeating this each time explicitly.
Let us recall that IAC (and UAC) may fail for the Backgammon-like games; an example was given in 1993 by Anne Condon [12] .
Yet, UNS (and INS) hold and result from Theorem 3 and the reduction of Section 5.
Remark 14 This proof looks like "a big gun for a small fly". Indeed, all known proofs of Theorem 3 are sophisticated and based on the Hardy-Littlewood Tauberian theorems [26] that summarize relations between the Abel and Cesaro averages. In 1957, in his proof Gillette [16] did not verify the corresponding conditions accurately and this flaw was repaired only in 1969 by Liggett and Lippman [33] .
We have no simpler proof for the UNS of the Backgammon-like games, although they are a very special case of the mean payoff games. In contrast, for the Chess-like games, UAC (and the remaining three properties) hold and can be proven much easier as follows.
First, let us show that in a Chess-like game G = (G, D, u) a uniform NE (that is, a saddle point) x * = (x * 1 , x * 2 ) exists and can be found by the following "modified backward induction" algorithm, which was recently and independently suggested in [2] and [8] .
In every position v ∈ V \V T = V 1 ∪V 2 we shall select one or several arcs so that a strategy profile x = (x 1 , x 2 ) is a uniform saddle point whenever the strategy x i chooses a selected arc in each v ∈ V i for i ∈ I = {1, 2}.
Remark 15
In contrast with the n-person Backgammon like games on acyclic digraphs, in this case we obtain some, but not necessarily all, optimal strategies of the players.
Without any loss of generality, we can make the following two assumptions:
(a) There are no parallel arcs in G, i.e., there is at most one arc e = (v, v ) from v to v .
Indeed, if there are several such arcs we can just identify them.
(b) Players 1 (respectively, player 2) prefers m terminal outcomes in the order a 1 , . . . , a m (respectively, in the reverse order). Moreover, we can assume that this order is strict, that is, there are no ties. Indeed, if several successive outcomes form a tie then we can just identify the corresponding terminal positions in G.
Then, the infinite outcome c should be placed somewhere between a 1 , . . . , a m and we will assume, for simplicity, that there are no ties, again.
Remark 16 This time we say "for simplicity" rather than "without loss of generality", because some uniformly optimal strategies might be lost due to the last assumption. However, this may happen even if we allow a tie between c and some terminal a j .
In particular, c might be the best outcome for player 1 or 2, but obviously not for both unless m = 0 (due to the last assumption; otherwise it would be also possible that m = 1).
In case m = 0 there are no terminals at all. Hence, each situation x ∈ X results in c and x is a uniform NE. Thus, in each position every move is optimal. Otherwise, by assumption (b), terminal a 1 is the best outcome for player 1. If a 1 is an isolated vertex, we eliminate it from G; otherwise, let us fix a move (v, a 1 ) in G and consider the following two cases.
If v ∈ V 1 , let us select the move (v, a 1 ) in G and then reduce G by contracting (v, a 1 ) and eliminating all other moves from v.
Remark 17 At this moment, some optimal moves in v might be lost. If v ∈ V 2 then let us eliminate only the arc (v, a 1 ) from G. It may happen that there are no other moves from v in G. Then v becomes a new terminal. In this case, let us identify it with a 1 and also select (v, a 1 ) in the original digraph G. In both cases, (v, a 1 ) may be a unique move to a 1 . Then, let us eliminate the obtained isolated terminal from G.
In all cases the original digraph G is reduced. Let us denote the obtained digraph by G and repeat the above procedure again, etc. Each time we choose the best terminal of player 1 or 2 until they are all eliminated and only infinite plays remain. Then, let us select all remaining arcs in the original digraph G.
Let us notice that arcs are eliminated in the current (reduced) digraphs, while they are selected in the original digraph G, the copy of which we keep all time.
By construction, in every position v ∈ V 1 ∪ V 2 at least one arc is selected and, moreover, a strategy profile x is a uniform NE whenever x chooses a selected arc in each position v ∈ V 1 ∪ V 2 . The obtained procedure, as well as the standard backward induction, provide linear time algorithms searching for a uniform NE in the Chess-like and acyclic games, respectively; see, however, Remarks 15 and 17.
Remark 18
In contrast, complexity of getting a uniform NE (saddle point) in a Backgammonlike game is a fundamental open problem, although its existence results from Theorem 3, by the reduction of Section 5. Unfortunately, the above algorithm cannot be extended to the Backgammon-like games, which, already in case m = 1, turn into the simple stochastic games [12] . The latter are known to be in the intersection of NP and co-NP and, yet, no polynomial or even pseudo-polynomial algorithm for their solution is known [12] . Moreover, it was recently shown that Condon's simple stochastic games and general Gillette's stochastic games with perfect information are polynomially equivalent [3] , see also [25] .
To prove UAC of the Chess-like games we just combine the above arguments, which prove UNS, and the arguments Section 4, which prove UAC of the Backgammon-like nperson games on acyclic digraphs. Again, in a minimal counterexample G = (G, D, u) with an im-cycle Y , for every edge e = (v, v ) ∈ V i , i ∈ I = {1, 2}, there are two strategy profiles x, x ∈ Y such that e is chosen by x i and not chosen by x i . Yet, the arc (v, a 1 ) (considered in the above proof of UNS) cannot satisfy this property. Indeed, if v ∈ V 1 then this move will be chosen by every strategy profile x ∈ Y , by the optimality of a 1 for player 1.
Remark 19
It is important to recall at this moment that the players are restricted to their lazy BR improvements.
In contrast, if v ∈ V 2 then move (v, a 1 ) will be chosen by no x ∈ Y unless (v, a 1 ) is a unique (forced) move in v. In both cases, we get a contradiction with minimality of G.
Thus, no im-path can cycle and, hence, it either can be extended or terminates in a uniform saddle point. This implies UAC, which, in its turn, implies UNS, IAC, and INS.
Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
Clearly, Theorem 2 results from Theorem 3. Indeed, given an n-person mean payoff game in which all players but one have their strategies fixed, we obtain a mean payoff game of the remaining single player i, or in other words, a controlled Markov chain. It is well known that in this case a uniformly optimal strategy x * i exists; see, for example, [4, 34] . This and the above reduction imply the statement of Theorem 2 for the Backgammon-like games.
In contrast, the situation with the two-person zero-sum Chess-like games (in particular, with Chess) is much better. Proofs of solvability were given in the early works by Zermelo [41] , König [28] , and Kalmar [27] . Surveys of these results and, in particular, of their relations to the classical Chess defined by the FIDE rules can be found in [40, 37, 13 ]. Yet, somewhat surprisingly, an efficient algorithm of solution was given only in 2009, independently in [2] and [8] . This algorithm (a modified of backward induction) finds some, but not all, positional uniformly optimal strategies of both players in (almost) linear time; see [2] for more details.
Finally, let us mention that the two-person zero-sum Chess-and Backgammon-like games are naturally extended to the n-person case. The concept of equilibrium (NE) suggested in 1950 by Nash [35, 36] is a natural replacement of the saddle points. Very soon after this, Kuhn [29, 30] and Gale [14] suggested an algorithm (backward induction) which finds all uniform (subgame perfect) NE in positional strategies in case of acyclic digraphs.
In fact, both classical and modified backward inductions imply not only UNS but UAC as well; see Sections 4 and 6, respectively.
Several questions related to NS and AC of the n-person Chess-and Backgammon-like games are summarized by Table 1 . All of them but two are resolved in this article.
